One of the most famous, and most derided, arguments against the morality of abortion is the argument from potential, which maintains that the fetus’ potential to become a person and enjoy the valuable life common to persons, entails that its destruction is prima facie morally impermissible. In this paper, I will revisit and offer a defense of the argument from potential. First, I will criticize the classical arguments proffered against the importance of fetal potential, specifically the arguments put forth by philosophers Peter Singer and David Boonin, by carefully unpacking the claims made in these arguments and illustrating why they are flawed. Secondly, I will maintain that fetal potential is morally relevant when it comes to the morality of abortion, but that it must be accorded a proper place in the argument. This proper place, however, cannot be found until we first answer a very important and complex question: we must first address the issue of personal identity, and when the fetus becomes the type of being who is relevantly identical to a future person. I will illustrate why the question of fetal potential can only be meaningfully addressed after we have first answered the question of personal identity and how it relates to the human fetus.
© Manninen; licensee BioMed Central Ltd. 2007
1. According to the needs of human rationality (therefore with no reference to Revelation, to which “moral theology” refers), the correct behavior with regard to the human embryo can be considered moral only if and in the measure in which it conforms to the human embryo’s nature or to his identity in the sense that it respects it and never contradicts it. Since the “nature” or the embryo’s own identity is that of a human being, the behavior with regard to the human embryo is only moral if and in the measure in which it considers and treats the human embryo like a human being, like any other human being. Moreover, since the human embryo is a human being from fertilization, this is the correct behavior from the very moment of the human embryo’s fertilization.
2. Every human being can ask the question: when did I begin? The “body” is an essential component of the human I. Therefore he or she begins when his or her body begins. So, the first question to answer is: when did my body begin? Biology can give a fundamental answer to this question. In fact, if one looks for this moment retrospectively and from an exclusively phenomenological point of view – covering the biological path from the moment in which I ask the question until the appearance of my body in this universe – and if one keeps in mind the inviolable law, acquired today through science, of the gradual formation of the organism, one consequently says: my body began at the moment of the fusion of the gametes, one from the father and one from the mother whose son or daughter I am.
This observation, which may be elementary, has always been accepted in its essential truth, even when nothing was known about embryology or about the mechanisms of the formation of a new human being. One can even state that it is indeed on this common phenomenological observation that the person who carries out artificial insemination bases his conviction that he is giving a “son” to the parents who have asked for it, from the very moment he produces the zygote that will than be transferred, at 4 or 8 cells, into the uterus where the process of bodily development will continue.
Objections, apparently founded on some data offered by embryology, have been raised against this common conviction.
However it seems to us that present knowledge in the fields of embryology and developmental genetics of mammals in general and man in particular – necessarily partial and always subject to interpretation and verification – offers proof of the elementary induction from common observation mentioned above.
The brevity of this document allows us to indicate only two series of data. From a deep analysis of this data our conviction emerges.
The first series of data comes from the study of the zygote and its formation. From these data it can be seen that, during the process of fertilization, as soon as the oocyte and the spermatozoon (two cellular systems teleologically and differently programmed) interact, a new system, which has two fundamental characteristics, immediately begins.
a) The new system is not simply the sum of the two sub-systems, but rather a combined system which begins working as a “new unit”, intrinsically determined to reach its specific final form, following the two sub-systems’ loss of individualization and autonomy and given the necessary conditions. This where the classical and still used “one-cell embryo” terminology comes from.
b) The biological center or coordinating structure of this new unit is the “new genome” with which the one-cell embryo is equipped; that is, the molecular complexes (visibly recognizable at a cytogenetic level in the chromosomes) which contain and conserve, like a frozen memory, a clearly defined design-project, with the essential and permanent “information” for the gradual and autonomous realization of such a project. It is this “genome” that identifies the one-cell embryo as biologically “human” and that specifies its individuality. It is this genome that grants the embryo enormous morphogenetic potential, which the embryo itself will gradually realize during all of its development, through a continuous interaction with both its cellular and extra-cellular environment, from which it receives signals and materials.
The second series of data arises from the examination of the development of the one-cell embryo, an in-depth examination carried out on laboratory mammals, which is completely extendable to the human embryo, not only by analogy, but also because of many facts already known. From what is known today, it clearly emerges that from the one-cell embryo one arrives at the formation of the complete organism with successive interconnected steps, which lead to the determination of cell lines and to the differentiation of tissues, accompanied by and/or followed by morphogenetic activity. It is important to underline three biological properties that characterize this developmental process.
i. Coordination. In the whole process, from the formation of the zygote onwards, there is a succession of molecular and cellular activity. This is guided by the information contained in the genome which is controlled by signals which come from interactions which continuously multiply at every level, in the embryo itself and between it and its environment. The rigorously coordinated expression of thousands of structural genes which involves and gives the organism, developing in time and space, its close unity, comes from this guide and from this control.
ii. Continuity. If the required conditions are met, the “new vital cycle” which begins at fertilization proceeds, without interruption. The single events, for example, cellular reproduction, cellular determination, the differentiation of the tissues and the formation of the organs, obviously appear successive. But the process of the formation of the organism in itself is continuous. It is still the same individual who is acquiring this definitive form. If this process were to be interrupted, at any moment, the individual would “die”.
iii. Gradualness. In the formation of a pluricellular organism, the fact that this organism acquires its final form through the passage of simple forms to more and more complex forms is intrinsic law. This law of the gradual acquisition of the final form implies that the embryo permanently maintains its own identity and individuality from the state of one cell onwards, throughout the whole process.
These two series of data, examined scientifically, lead to one single conclusion, which, in the logic of biology, it seems impossible to deny. At the fusion of the gametes, a “new human cell”, equipped with a new information structure, begins operating like an individual unit tending towards the complete expression of its genome, which manifests itself in a totality, which constantly and autonomously organizes itself until it forms a complete human organism. This “new human cell” is therefore a “new human individual” which initiates “its own vital cycle” and given the sufficient and necessary internal and external conditions, gradually develops and achieves its immense potential according to an intrinsic ontogenetic law and unifying plan.
We therefore do not consider in accordance with correct biological logic establishing – as is sometimes suggested – the moment of the beginning of the individual human being at the 15th day from fertilization, that is, when the “primitive streak” is visible and twin separation can no longer occur, or at the 8th week, when, even though only in miniature, the complete form of the organism is evident, or even later, when the cerebral cortex is sufficiently formed.
Even respecting the effort made in elaborating these opinions, an effort directed towards the search for the truth about the beginning of an individual human being, when they are accurately examined the arguments that these opinions are based on do not result in proving the assumption or in invalidating the conclusion we propose.
Philosophical reflection can provide a deeper understanding. If one accepts the biological datum in all its entirety, this philosophical reflection must highlight the relationship of the above mentioned biological conclusion with the concept of the individual human being in its totality. At the same time it must explain the relationship between the period of embryonic life and the expansion of the fully developed personality.
Such reflection allows one to overcome any dissociation between the “biological” component and the “socio-psychological” component of the person, and therefore between the “ontological” and “phenomenological” aspects of the person himself.
The first conclusion that rational reflection offers us is that the human embryo is not pure potentiality but a living and individualized substance.
The human embryo is undoubtedly a being in whom, as in all living substances, the principle of development and change is within the substance itself. It is really this internal principle that determines the embryo’s development, and not that of an external being, for example, the mother. Thus the expression which says the embryo is potentially a man is equivocal and misleading. The embryo is potentially a child, or adult, or potentially an old man, but it is not potentially a human being. That is what it already actually is. The ovule, like the spermatozoon, is “potentially” a human being, but the ovule only remains an ovule and the spermatozoon only remains a spermatozoon if they do not unite. On the other hand, the zygote is actually already a human being, developing his own internal program. This program is already complete, sufficient, individualized and activates itself obviously only when there are the necessary conditions for development.
Therefore, before fertilization, the spermatozoon and the ovule only possess a mere possibility of making up a unified system and entity. The zygote, however, is an individual with his own life, and with his own identity given to him by a single unifying substantial principle.
It is obvious that, in order to develop physically and culturally, the embryo needs the external environment, that is, physical and cultural. But the environmental stimuli are assimilated by him according to his own law of development, exactly as with the child or with the adult. The essential, qualitative leap occurs in the step from two substances between which there exists just an external relationship (gametes), to the one single substance (zygote). This passage occurs during fertilization, not before and not after. Only at fertilization or conception does a man actually begin to exist.
In its development the substantial “unity” of the zygote reveals a substantial “continuity”, because the principle of development and of change is within the substance itself. Therefore one cannot conceive of different and successive existences in the same living embryo. This completely conforms with the phenomenological and embryological data. In every phase of the some subject’s development, it maintains its ontological unity with the previous phase, with no interruption.
If this is true, from a logical and rational point of view, one must conclude that, ontologically, there is an identity in the whole of the course of the development of that unique individual who, once born, is recognized by everyone as having the quality and the dignity of a human being.
The oneness which exists during all of an individual human being’s development, from fertilization to death, is not simply biological continuity. It is a unity of the whole being, both the body and the spirit, even if the expansion and the maturation of the individual, both somatically and spiritually, takes place progressively. No beginning of this maturation and of the relationship that exists between the unique subject’s body and spirit can be traced different from that which marks the beginning of a biologically individualized life.
From a psychological and social point of view, the human being fulfills himself as a personality along a long path of relationships and cultural contributions. This fact does not exclude, but rather requires, from an ontological point of view, that the human being should possess whatever will allow him to fulfil himself as a personality, from the beginning of embryonic life. Therefore he must obtain the respect due to a human being.
Consequently, from the point of view of ontological reality, the person’s dignity should be recognized and attributed to each individual human being from the very moment of fertilization. In this sense, one cannot see how an individual human being can exist, who is not also a person.
When talking generally about a person, one often thinks of a determinate and intelligent being: a singularity individualized in a body, within a historical tradition and, as such, unique and unrepeatable; a subjectivity which in its individuality is at the same time awareness, capable of taking in the universal and therefore values, the meanings of what exists; the person, that is, as self-consciousness, as meaning-oriented freedom, as world insight. In this way one outlines a vision of man which we could define as complete and mature. One is led to ask oneself what the relationship is between the zygote and the man who appears in this personal fullness.
The answer requires an explanation of the notion and concept “end”. The end of a being is the reason why the being exists, begins to exist, structures itself during its development and matures in its completion. The end is what explains the existence of a determinate being and it reveals its why and its meaning. However, this also means that the end is not simply at the end but is at the beginning of a being’s development like a direction giver. One might not recognize this end in its fullness, but that is not a reason for excluding it from reality from the beginning. If it were not there from the beginning as a direction giver there would be no chance of completion and that being would not be what it is either before or later. The some considerations have to be applied to this being’s ontological value and dignity. These are not just a conclusive event but rather they endow the reality in question from the moment it begins. They mark it from the beginning because they actually belong to its essential destiny.
The study of these two aspects leads to the conclusion that the beginning of individual life is the beginning of a man’s personal life. That study is both the reasoning founded on the unity of the human being’s development from the moment of fertilization – a unity based on the substantial unifying principle of the development itself, which excludes any kind of dualistic anthropology – and the reflection based on the concept of aim or “telos” of direction of the human being’s maturation.
The first principle to apply to the human embryo is that which refers to every man’s fundamental right to life and to physical and genetical integrity. That is how the protection, already recognized for children, the sick and the physically and mentally handicapped, has to be extended to the human embryo.
It is not so much a question of forming a special right, as of adapting the common right to a particular case. Therefore, as for the man who is born, the unborn child’s right to life and health will first have to be ratified, and also the legal prohibition of any intervention on the embryo that is not carried out for the overall well-being of the embryo itself. As the life of the man who is born, that of the human embryo has to be recognized as inviolable and as not exploitable for any external purpose or for scientific or medical experimental research, for the supply of cells or tissues for pharmacological or transplant reasons, or for the production of other human beings (clones and chimeras). However implicitly they abstractly recognize human dignity in the embryo, the laws on abortion have actually abdicated in the duty of assuring it of adequate protection.
A second principle, which will have to inspire a law on our subject, is the principle of the family. One must recognize and ratify the right to come into existence within the context of an authentic family bond for the conceived or for him whom one intends to conceive.
5. The same psychology, in particular social psychology, provides interesting observations to help understand the meanings with which the human being is interwoven, from the time he was conceived. In fact the embryo does not only live a life but he is experienced as a subject, by lives that exist before him, in an interweaving of relationships culturally marked by values and subjective meanings.
One can thus learn that, before the human embryo is born and thinks and speaks, he is already thought of and “spoken about”, like a significant subject who belongs to a social group.
In this perspective it seems obvious that culture itself, one of man’s own characteristics, involves the human being from the moment he is conceived.
6. What is the correct behavior with regard to the human embryo from an ethical point of view? This is the question to which ethical science is required to give a critically elaborated and therefore justified answer. In giving its answer, on the one hand ethical science accepts the results reached by the other human sciences – beginning from biology – and on the other hand it considers them according to its scientific “specificity” and therefore with its own criteria of analysis and evaluation.
According to the needs of human rationality (therefore with no reference to Revelation, to which “moral theology” refers), the correct behavior with regard to the human embryo can be considered moral only if and in the measure in which it conforms to the human embryo’s nature or to his identity in the sense that it respects it and never contradicts it. Since the “nature” or the embryo’s own identity is that of a human being, the behavior with regard to the human embryo is only moral if and in the measure in which it considers and treats the human embryo like a human being, like any other human being. Moreover, since the human embryo is a human being from fertilization, this is the correct behavior from the very moment of the human embryo’s fertilization.
This conclusion is completely justified by the above-mentioned scientific and rational gains.
Despite the solidity of such a conclusion, some people believe that the human embryo is not a human being from the moment of fertilization. Yet it is particularly important to point out why, in insisting on the above-mentioned behavior (considering and treating the human embryo like a human being, like any other human being from the moment of fertilization) ethical science does not need the absolute certainty that the human embryo is a human being from the moment of fertilization, a certainty that some people might deny or do actually deny. The doubt alone about the personal identity of the fruit of conception, is enough for one to be morally obliged to behave in the safest way, thus avoiding any danger or risk with regard to the human being. Morality in fact, requires that one abstains not only from an act which is definitely bad but also from an act which is probably bad.
In reality, acting in doubt as to whether there is a human being in the fruit of conception or not means exposing oneself to the risk of killing a human being, which in itself is a moral disorder.
In the light of this ethical principle one can understand why the Catholic Church, while it has left aside (and still leaves aside) discussions about spiritual animation (whether immediate or delayed), has always clearly and strongly supported the moral obligation, to behave with regard to the human embryo (and from conception), in the some way as with regard to a human being. The discussion is on a theoretical level not on a practical level. This is why, the “Declaration on Procured Abortion” (1974) of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith says: “Moreover, it is not up to biological sciences to make a definitive judgement on questions which are properly philosophical and moral, such as the moment when a human person is constituted or the legitimacy of abortion. From a moral point of view this is certain: even if a doubt existed concerning whether the fruit of conception is already a human person, it is objectively a grave sin to dare to risk murder. ‘He too is a man who will be a man’ (Tertullian, Apologeticum, IX,8)” (n.13).
This position is confirmed by the recent Instruction, Donum Vitae: “The Magisterium has not expressly committed itself to an affirmation of a philosophical nature, but it constantly reaffirms the moral condemnation of any kind of procured abortion. This teaching has not been changed and is unchangeable…Thus the fruit of human generation, from the first moment of its existence, that is to say from the moment the zygote has formed, demands the unconditional respect that is morally due to the human being in this bodily and spiritual totality. The human being is to be respected and treated as a person from the moment of conception, and therefore from that same moment his rights as a person must be recognized, among which in the first place is the inviolable right of every innocent human being to life” (1,I)
Here we have a fundamental and general principle, from which, following a rigorous logic, ethical science obtains a series of special principles. Two of these need to be studied closely. The first concerns therapeutic intervention, the second experimental intervention.
With identical conditions in any other human being and paying specific attention to the embryonic and fetal life situation, the intervention directed towards curing and healing must be considered licit, and even before that directed towards the individual survival of the human embryo. This morally licit behavior is not only conditioned by the intended therapy but also by the concrete modality of the intervention. On the one hand, the intervention has to respect the embryo’s life and integrity and it must not involve disproportionate risks for him. On the other hand, the intervention has to have the parents’ free and informed consent, according to the deontological rules in the case of children.
Moreover, if the intervention is experimental (apart from obviously therapeutic experimentation), one must distinguish the two cases of the embryo which is still alive and the embryo which is dead. Experimentation on the living embryo, whether it is viable or not, is undoubtedly extremely illicit. By its nature it constitutes an exploitation of the human embryo as an “object”. “To use human embryos or fetuses as the object or instrument of experimentation constitutes a crime against their dignity as human beings having a right to the same respect that is due to the child already born and to every human person” (Donum Vitae, 1,4). On the other hand, the case of the dead embryo or fetus, whether due to voluntary abortion or not, is the same as that of any other dead human being: “In particular, they cannot be subjected to mutilation or to autopsies if their death has not yet been verified and without the consent of the parents or of the mother. Furthermore, the moral requirements must be safeguarded that there be no complicity in deliberate abortion and that the risk of scandal be avoided. Also, in the case of dead fetuses, as for the corpses of adult persons, all commercial trafficking must be considered illicit and should be prohibited” (Ibid.).
Ethical considerations can develop, not only in the light of human reason (natural ethics), as we have shown above, but also in the light of the Revelation of God and therefore in the light of faith (moral theology). From a theological point of view there are some “truths” which, in original terms, illuminate the double question of the human and personal identity of the embryo and of correct behavior with respect to it.
The first truth is that of the “lordship” of God the Creator and the Father over human life, a lordship which consists in the “gift” of life. It is not just a question of the human life of he who is already born but also of the human life of he who is still in this mother’s womb (cf. Jer 1:4-5; 2 Macc 7:22-23; Job 10:8-12; Ps 22:10-11 and 71:6; the whole of the 139th Psalm).
The second truth is about the origin by creation of every human being: “At the origin of every human person there is a creative act of God: no man comes into existence by chance; he is always that result of the creative love of God” (John Paul II, Address of 17th September 1983). Hence the inevitable question that everyone (every “believer”) can and should ask himself: when did God create me? There can only be one rationally valid answer: God created me at the origin of my being, that is, at the very moment of my conception, since no moment of my being is possible without it being the result of God’s creative act. In this sense, the Christian tradition, proposed once again by the Second Vatican Council, presents “procreation”, that is, the human procreative act, as a cooperation with the creative love of God (cf. Gaudium et spes, n.50).
The third truth, which constitutes the summit of Revelation, concerns the Incarnation of the Word. God’s eternal Son possesses human nature, our same human nature (cf. John 1: 14). The inevitable question arises again: from when did God’s eternal Son possess human nature? And again the only rationally valid answer is the following: from His origin in time, that is, with and from conception in the womb of the Virgin Mother of God. The following passage in the Letter to the Hebrews is particularly interesting for theological reflection: “And this is what He said, on coming into the world: ‘You who wanted no sacrifice or oblation, prepared a body for me…’ ” (Heb 10:5 ff).
June 22nd 1989
Note: The original text of this paper is in Italian.
Excerpt from an interview with Ken Kesey by Paul Krasner.
The REALIST Issue Number 90 – May-June, 1971 pages 46-47
Krassner: And yet, since you’re against abortion, doesn’t that put you in the position of saying that a girl or a woman must bear an unwanted child as punishment for ignorance or carelessness?
Kesey: In as I feel abortions to be probably the worst worm in the revolutionary philosophy, a worm bound in time to suck the righteousness and the life from the work we are engaged in. I want to take this slowly and carefully. This is the story of Freddy Schrimpler:
As part of his training, a psychiatric aide must spend at least two weeks working the geriatric wards. or ..shit pits.. as they were called by the other aides. These wards are concrete barns built, not for attempted cures or even for attempted treatments of the herds of terminal humanity that would otherwise be roaming the streets, pissing and drooling and disgusting the healthy citizenry, but for nothing more than shelter and sustenance, waiting rooms where old guys spend ten, twenty, sometimes thirty years waiting for their particular opening in the earth. At eight in the morning they are herded and wheeled into showers, then to Day Rooms where they are fed a toothless goo, then are plunked into sofas ripe with decades of daily malfunctions of worn out sphincters, then fed again, and washed again, and their temperatures taken if they’re still warm enough to register, and their impacted bowels dug free in the case of sphincters worn-out in the other direction, and their hair and the cheesy old fingernails clipped (the clippings swept into a little pink and grey piles), and fed again and washed again, and then usually left alone through the long afternoons.
Some of these derelicts still have a lot going and enjoy trapping flies and other such morsels in the snare of their baited hands, and some engage in contented and garrulous conversations with practically anything, and some watch TV, but most of them lie motionless on the plastic covered sofas or in gurney beds, little clots of barely-breathing bones and skin under the government sheets. Even the Doctors call them vegetables.
In caring for these men something becomes immediately obvious to all the young aides undergoing their first real brush with responsibility. The thought is very explicit. After the first meal squeezed into a slack mouth, or after the first diaper change or catheter taping, every one of the trainees have thought this thought, and some have spoken it:
“Without our help these guys would die!”
And, after the hundredth feeding and diapering and changing, the next thought, though never spoken, is:
“Why don’t we just let them die?
An awful question to find in your head, because even young aides know that age can happen to anyone. “This could I some day be?” But even fear of one’s own future can’t stop the asking: “Why don’t we just let them die?” What’s wrong with letting nature take its own corpse? Why do humans feel they have the right to forestall the inevitable fate of others? Freddy Schrimpler helped me find my answer:
Freddy was 70 or 80 years old and had been on the Geriatrics Ward for close to twenty years From morning until bed· time he lay in the day room in a gurney bed against the wall, on his side under a sheet, his little head covered with a faint silver gossamer that seemed too delicate to be human hair—it looked more like a fungus mycelium joining the head to the pillow — and his mouth drooling a continual puddle at his cheek. Only his eyes moved, pale and bright blue they followed the activity in the ward like little caged birds. The only sound he made was a muffled squeeking back in his throat when he had dirtied his sheets and, since his bowels were usually impacted, like most of the inmates who couldn’t move. this sound was made but rarely and even then, seemed to exhaust him for hours.
One afternoon, as I made my rounds to probe with rectal thermometer at the folds or wasted glutinous maximus of these gurney bed specimens – hospital policy made it clear that the temperature of anything breathing, even vegetables, had to be logged once a month. I heard this stifled squeek. I looked up; it was Freddy’s squeek but since it was his temperature I was attempting to locate I knew that he hadn’t shit his sheets, I resumed my probing, somewhat timidly, for the flesh of these men is without strength and a probe in the wrong direction can puncture an intestine. The squeek came again, slower, and sounding remarkably like speech! I moved closer to the pink and toothless mouth, feeling his breath at my ear.
“Makes you kind of nervous, don’t it?” he squeeked.
The voice was terribly strained and faltering, but even through the distortion you could clearly make out the unmistakable tone of intelligence and awareness and, most astonishingly, humor.
In the days that followed I brought my ear to that mouth as often as the nurses, let me get away with it. He told me his story. A stroke years ago had suddenly clipped all the wires leading from the brain to the body. He found that while he could hear and see perfectly, he couldn’t send anything back out to the visitors that dropped by his hospital bed more and more infrequently. Finally they sent him to the VA, to this ward where, after years of effort, he had learned to make his little squeek. Sure, the doctors and nurses knew he could talk, but they were too busy to shoot the breeze and didn’t really think he should exhaust himself by speaking. So he was left on his gurney to drift alone in his rudderless vessel with his short· wave unable to send. He wasn’t crazy; in fact, the only difference that I could see between Freddy and Buddha· was in the incline of their lotus position. As I got to know him I spoke of the young aides’ thought, “Let a man die for his own good?” he squeeked, incredulous.
“Never believe it. When a man, when anything, is ready to stop living it stops. You watch.”
Before I left the ward, two of the vegetables died. They stopped eating and died, as though a decision of the whole being was reached and nothing man or medicine could do would turn this decision, as though the decision was cellularly unanimous, (I remember a friend telling me about her attempted suicide; she lay down and placed a rag soaked in carbon tetra-chloride over her face. But just before she went out completely, there was a sudden clamor from all the rest of her: “Hey! Wait! What about us? Why weren’t we consulted!?” And being a democratic girl at heart she rallied over mind’s presumptuous choice. “Our mind has no right to kill our body!.” she told me after the attempt! “Not on the grounds of boredom, anyway.”) and that met with the satisfaction of all concerned.
Punishment of unwed mothers? Bullshit! Care of neither the old nor the young can be considered to be punishment for the able, not even the care of the undead old, or the un-born young. These beings, regardless not only of race, creed and color but as well of size, situation or ability, must be treated as equals and their rights to life not only recognized but defended. Can they defend themselves?
You are you from conception, and that never changes no matter what physical changes your body takes. And the virile sport in the Mustang driving to work with his muscular forearm tanned and ready for a day’s labor has not one microgram more right to his inalienable rights of life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness than has the three-month’s fetus riding in a sack of water or the vegetable rotting for twenty years in a gurney bed. Who’s to know the value or extent of another’s trip? How can we assume that the world through the wind shield of that Mustang is any more rich or holy or even sane than the world before those pale blue eyes? How can abortion be anything but fascism again, back as a fad in a new intellectual garb with a new and more helpless, victim?
I swear to you, Paul, that abortions are a terrible karmic bummer, and to support them – except in cases where there is a bona fide toss-up between the child and the mother’s life— is to harbor a worm of discrepancy
Krassner: Well, that’s really eloquent and mistypoo but suppose Faye were raped and became pregnant in the process?
Kesey: Nothing is changed. You don’t plow under the corn because the seed was planted with a neighbor’s shovel.
Krassner: I assume that it would be her decision, though?
Kesey: Almost certainly. But I don’t really feel right about speaking for her. Why don’t you phone and ask?
[Krassner phones Faye Kesey in Oregon and reviews the dialogue. She asks: “Now, what’s the question, if I were raped, would I get an abortion?” Krassner: “That about sums it up.” Faye Kesey: “No, I wouldn’t.”]